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The Economic Efficiency Case
Against Business Tax Privacy
Daniel Schaffa*
By statute, business tax returns are not publicly available. But with
public access, investors would acquire useful information that would help
them make better investing decisions; business tax compliance and planning
would become more uniform, preventing tax-savvy firms from gaining an
advantage over other relatively more productive firms; and businesses could
learn from one another, which would spare firms the cost of redundantly
developing the same tax strategies. In the long run, these efficiency gains
could result in lower prices, higher wages, more innovation, more leisure,
and better investment returns. In the debate over business tax privacy, these
sorts of economic efficiency arguments have received surprisingly little
attention. This Article argues that economic efficiency is central to the
debate and may well change where we come out on business tax privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s tax returns are at the center of a growing tax privacy
controversy.1 These documents surely contain a treasure trove of
information about President Trump’s business empire.2 If public, they would
reveal how the Trump Organization interprets key elements of tax law, how
it shelters its income from taxes, and how it structures some of its
transactions—likely through a complicated network of parent, subsidiary,
and affiliate entities.3 Of course, under current law, neither Trump’s
individual nor his business tax returns are accessible by the public.4
Since the 1920s, tax privacy has been the law of the land, but that is not
to say that the wisdom of tax privacy is settled.5 Scholars have spilled much
ink debating tax privacy, primarily focusing on corporate tax returns.6
Defenders of corporate tax privacy have posited an inherent right to privacy,7
voiced concerns about how corporations could lose their competitive
advantage if forced to publish their returns,8 and predicted that eliminating
corporate tax privacy might lead to tax shelter proliferation.9 Opponents of
1
Interest in President Trump’s tax returns stems from politically charged concerns that
he has a business or foreign conflict of interest or may not be complying with tax law despite
being the chief executive of the United States. Erica Werner & Damian Paletta, Trump
Defiant as Democrats Prep Push for His Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-suggests-he-wont-turn-over-taxreturns-even-if-democrats-demand-them/2018/11/07/396ae650-e2ad-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd5
3ca6b_story.html; Jeff Stein, House Democrats Begin Hearings on Obtaining President
Trump’s Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2019),https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2019/02/07/house-democrats-begin-hearings-getting-president-trumps-tax-returns/.
2
Tax privacy issues have received extraordinary attention since President Trump’s
campaign gained traction. See, e.g., Timothy O’Brien, A New Reason for Trump to Release
His Tax Returns: Helsinki, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opin
ion/articles/2018-07-17/helsinki-2018-putin-and-trump-s-tax-returns.
3
Some of President Trump’s 1995 tax return was leaked, showing a $916 million-dollar
loss that could be used to offset income. Pages from Donald Trump’s 1995 Income Tax
Records, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/01/us/po
litics/donald-trump-taxes.html.
4
I.R.C. § 6103 (2019).
5
See infra Part IA.
6
See Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31
(2014); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information
Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95 (2005); David Lenter, Joel Slemrod &
Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting,
Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803 (2003).
7
Tax Executives Institute, TEI Opposes Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns,
58 TAX EXECUTIVE 241, 241 (2006) (arguing that “[p]rivacy is a core American value”).
8
This information includes “revenue and expense information by legal entity,
jurisdiction, and functional category.” Id. at 242.
9
Blank, supra note 6, at 38. This Article turns Blank’s argument on its head by arguing
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corporate tax privacy have countered that public access to corporate returns
would increase detection of illegal tax evasion,10 result in shaming of
unethical corporate behavior,11 catalyze beneficial policy changes,12 and
generally increase the public’s understanding of tax law.13
The scholarship behind the corporate tax privacy debate is insightful
but misses two key points. First, there is little reason to focus solely on
corporate tax returns. Corporations comprise only a tiny fraction of US
businesses.14 Eliminating corporate tax privacy would reveal nothing new
about non-corporate business entities, including partnerships and LLCs, and
thus would miss many of the benefits of eliminating business tax privacy.15
Moreover, if only corporate returns were made public, some businesses

that there may be economic benefits to having tax shelter proliferation and public access to
business tax return information more broadly. Blank focuses only on the possible effect of
eliminating business tax privacy on government revenue, while this Article looks at the
economy’s productivity and the efficiency of tax collection.
10
Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 99. Tax evasion is the illegal underreporting of tax
liability. Tax avoidance is at least plausibly legal behavior designed to minimize tax liability.
There is some evidence that tax compliance is higher for publicly traded firms and firms in
heavily regulated industries, suggesting that non-IRS eyes can affect compliance. Eric M.
Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 125–62 (Joel Slemrod ed. 1992).
11
Walgreens opted not to pursue an inversion when it merged with a foreign competitor,
and its stock price immediately fell over fourteen percent. Kim Hjelmgaard & Kevin McCoy,
Walgreen’s Stock Smacked After Tax Inversion Out, USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2014, 7:13 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/06/walgreens-alliance-bootschicago/13659809/. See also Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax
Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter
Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126 (2009) (offering suggestive evidence that investors
respond positively to tax management); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations
and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L
TAX J. 409, 423 (2002) (reporting that the share values of Stanley Works jumped when it
announced plans to invert).
12
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by the Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990).
E.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, for example, was partially a
response to a public outcry over the number of wealthy individuals that were using shelters to
pay little or no tax.
13
Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 103. Many individuals, however, do not increase their
understanding of tax law, even in cases where it is in their personal financial interest to do so.
See Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete
Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(2015) (finding evidence that many taxpayers that are eligible for the EITC do not claim it).
14
Only 5% of businesses file corporate tax returns. Corporations do, however, account
for 62% of business receipts. Andrew Lundeed & Kyle Pomerlau, Corporations Make up 5
Percent of Businesses but Earn 62% of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://taxfoundation.org/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-percentrevenues/.
15
The Trump Organization, for example, is likely comprised of mostly non-corporate
business entities.
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would respond by converting to non-corporate forms.16 Second, and more
importantly, business tax privacy harms the economy. In most tax policy
debates, the economic efficiency of competing policies is central.17 Yet the
business tax privacy debate has paid almost no attention to the economic
efficiency implications of tax privacy.18
This Article argues that eliminating business tax privacy would
improve the allocation of economic resources by making important
information publicly available. This information could be put to good use in
two ways. First, investors could use business tax return information to build
more accurate financial models. Using these improved models, investors
would direct more capital to more deserving firms.19
Second, firms could learn from each other’s tax returns, which would
have two benefits.20 One, it would make tax outcomes more uniform across
firms. Uniform tax outcomes are economically efficient because they
prevent tax-savvy firms from having an advantage over non-tax-savvy firms.
Economic output is maximized when investing decisions are made on the
basis of the relative productivity of firms and not confounding factors such
as how adept a firm is at outrunning the IRS.21 Two, if firms learned from
each other’s tax returns, each firm would spend fewer resources developing
its own tax strategies because each would have at least partial access to the
strategies of all the others. This would reduce wasteful and redundant
expenditure, allowing businesses to spend more on wages and research or to
pass savings on to consumers and investors.22
These efficiencies overwhelm many of the business-centric arguments
in favor of business tax privacy.23 While businesses lose the advantage of
keeping their own returns private, they gain the advantage of having access
to the universe of business tax returns.24 Being forced to disclose only its
returns would place a business at a severe disadvantage. Simultaneously
gaining access to all other business returns, however, would entirely negate
that disadvantage on average while also making tax avoidance cheaper.
16

Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826.
This is true in academic circles where scholars attempt to find the deadweight loss of
taxes and is also true in political circles where putatively bad tax policies are labeled job
killers.
18
For the purposes of this Article, efficiency is efficiency in allocation. For a definition
see PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 29 (3rd ed. 2013).
19
See infra Part IIA and Part IIIB1.
20
See infra Part IIB.
21
See infra Part IIIB2.
22
See infra Part IIIB3.
23
See infra Part IIIC4.
24
Essentially, this argument is framed in what economists would call partial equilibrium
as opposed to general equilibrium. They are thinking only of only one moving part but would
come to a different conclusion were they to step back and observe the entire machine.
17
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Some firms would be losers, including those that currently prevent investors
from finding adverse information available in tax returns and those that have
a comparative advantage in tax sheltering. But businesses in aggregate
would benefit.
Before proceeding, two points merit mention. First, these arguments
do not depend on whether one thinks tax sheltering itself is beneficial for the
economy as a whole. Rather, they suggest that in a world with widespread
tax sheltering it is better to lower the barriers that impede the flow of business
tax information.25 This approach prevents firms that are particularly good at
tax sheltering from having an economic advantage over firms that are not. It
also limits the wasteful and redundant spending on securing tax-sheltering
advantages, while providing investors with valuable information.
Second, this analysis only applies to businesses, and most especially to
large businesses. There are stronger privacy interests that warrant keeping
the tax returns of individuals private.26 And there is little if any economic
efficiency upside to making individual tax returns public.27
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the necessary
background by explaining how tax privacy came to be, the basics of business
tax returns, and what information business tax returns contain that is nowhere
else publicly available. Part II shows how business tax privacy causes
investors to experience adverse outcomes and businesses to have nonuniform tax planning. Part III considers the aggregate economic impact of
adverse investor outcomes and non-uniform business tax planning,
demonstrating the economic inefficiencies caused by business tax privacy.
Part III also discusses the potential downsides of eliminating business tax
privacy, including why these downsides may not outweigh the benefits.
Finally, Part III argues that eliminating business tax privacy by changing a
small section of the Internal Revenue Code is preferable to other more
complicated and politically fraught solutions that might have similar
economic benefits.
Tax privacy has recently received an astounding volume of media
coverage. But while access to presidential tax returns may dominate the
headlines, access to business tax returns generally is where we should focus
25
Moreover, public access to returns would decrease the returns to developing new tax
shelters. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 940–50 (2010); see generally Brant J. Hellwig,
Questioning the Wisdom of Patent Protection for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1005
(2007).
26
See infra Part IA and Part IB.
27
Greater individual income tax transparency could reduce compliance costs if
individual taxpayers learned from one another. Software such as TurboTax, however, has
reduced individual taxpayer compliance costs substantially, and many of the most vexing tax
issues on individual tax returns relate to business activities.
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our attention.
I. HIDDEN RETURNS
Before exploring the economic efficiency implications of business tax
privacy, it is important to understand the information contained in business
tax returns and the laws currently shielding these documents from public
view. This Part first provides a brief history of business tax privacy, noting
the original legislative impulse to make corporate tax returns public and the
Supreme Court cases that have held there is no constitutional right to tax
privacy. Then, this Part explains what business tax returns are and
demonstrates why even the most promising sources of other information,
namely financial statements, fall far short of providing the data available on
business tax returns.
A. A Brief History of Tax Privacy
Whether businesses in the United States should be entitled to tax
privacy is a question as old as the corporate tax, and US law has answered
this question in different ways at different times.28 In 1909, when Congress
enacted the first incarnation of the corporate income tax (a one percent excise
tax on corporate net income in excess of $5,000), corporate tax returns were
intended to live in the public record and be subject to public inspection.29
The overarching justification for the public record provision was that it
would aid in the regulation of corporations. Indeed, for progressives like
President Taft, the primary appeal of the corporate income tax was not the
additional government revenue but rather the benefits stemming from public
access to corporate tax returns.30
Public inspection, however, never came to be. In 1910, the
Commissioner of the IRS ruled that since Congress had not appropriated
sufficient funds, the IRS was not obligated to maintain corporate tax returns
in a searchable fashion.31 Eventually Congress did appropriate funds but
simultaneously restricted corporate tax inspection to those authorized by

28
See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990). For brief accounts of the early legislative
history of corporate tax privacy in the United States, see Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford,
supra note 6, at 807–10; Blank, supra note 6, at 42–45.
29
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116. The tax was an excise
and not an income tax to avoid falling afoul of Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895), reh’g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding that the 1894 federal income tax was
unconstitutional because the tax was not levied in proportion to each state’s population).
30
Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance
Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE, 951, 976–77 (1990).
31
No Publicity Now in Corporation Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1910, at 1; Kornhauser,
supra note 6, at 101.
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order of the President.32
The 1920s saw the tax privacy pendulum swing back and forth. In a
provision of the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress made the amount of income
tax paid by individuals and corporations public information.33 Objectors—
including President Coolidge—raised privacy concerns,34 and in 1926 a
revised revenue act mandated that only names and addresses, but not taxes
paid, be public record.35
The most recent legislation making tax data publicly available came in
the early 1930s in response to a Congressional investigation that brought to
light significant corporate tax evasion.36 Congress responded by including a
provision in the Revenue Act of 1934 that required individuals and
corporations to attach a pink slip to their returns.37 The pink slips were public
information and recorded the taxpayer’s name, address, gross income,
amount of deductions, net income, and tax liability.38 Again, objectors raised
privacy concerns and also argued that revealing proprietary information on
tax returns could harm corporations.39 In protest, opposed constituents sent
fake pink slips to their Congressmen, and Congress repealed the law before
it took effect.40
Meanwhile, presidents retained the power to authorize the inspection of
returns. Some presidents, including Nixon, wielded this power as a weapon
against political opponents.41 When the public became aware of this
presidential abuse of power in the fallout from the Watergate scandal,
Congress eliminated the presidential prerogative to authorize tax return
inspection.42
Since 1976, Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code has ensured
that returns remain confidential with access limited to a handful of parties,
including (1) persons with material interest, (2) certain government
32

Later revisions allowed shareholders to examine the returns of the corporations they
were invested in and anyone to examine the returns of publicly traded companies, but only at
the Commissioner’s office. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 126–31.
33
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257 (b), 43 Stat. 253, 293.
34
These concerns applied mostly to individuals and not corporations. In particular,
objectors feared that the information would make it easier for criminals to kidnap or scam
wealthy individuals. Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data:
Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 392–94 (1993).
35
Id. at 396–97.
36
Id. at 398.
37
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698.
38
Id.
39
Pomp, supra note 34, at 401.
40
Pomp, supra note 34, at 400.
41
Mark Berggren, I.R.C. 6103: Let’s Get to the Source of the Problem, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 825, 825–26 (1999).
42
Id.
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employees for tax administration purposes, and (3) government agencies
pursuing a non-tax criminal investigation.43 This confidentiality is, however,
purely statutory. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that there is no
constitutional right to tax privacy.44 In other words, Congress could easily
hark back to original corporate tax law and make business tax returns public.
Other jurisdictions entitle businesses to less tax privacy. A few states
currently make parts of the state corporate income tax return public, and
property tax information is often public in the United States.45 Some
countries make public select corporate return information, and a subset of
these countries specifically release the identities of corporations that have
committed fraud or other violations in reporting their tax information.46
B. Business Tax Returns and Their Contents
If business tax returns were public, what information would be
revealed? The answer depends on the particular business’s legal
classification. For tax purposes, there are three main business types:
corporations, partnerships, and sole-proprietorships.47
Corporations stand apart because, in addition to having distinct taxreporting requirements, corporations must pay corporate income tax.48 To
report their tax liability to the government, corporations are required to
annually file a corporate tax return. The mainstem of the corporate tax return
is Form 1120, which records a corporation’s sources of income, allowable
deductions, taxable income, tax liability, and taxes owed. Underlying Form
43
The law was amended in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
1520. Persons with material interest are exempted in I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(D) (2012); certain
government employees for tax administration purposes in I.R.C. § 6103(d)(2) (2012); and
government agencies conducting criminal investigations in I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (2012).
44
United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378 (1925) (holding that a newspaper could print
tax return information). See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (noting the
beneficial effects of the public having access to corporate tax returns and suggesting that
government publication of tax documents did not violate the Constitution, in particular the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
45
See Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 810–813. Non-profits in the US
are required to file Form 990 which is publicly available.
46
Id. Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Finland make some information public, but none of
them make all relevant documents publicly available. Australia has also recently changed its
tax regime to require more public tax disclosures. Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Leslie Robinson & Joel
Slemrod, Public Tax-return Disclosure, 66 J. ACCT & ECON 142, 142–44 (2018).
47
Other tax classifications include S corporations, trusts, and not-for-profit
organizations. S corporations are pass through entities, similar to partnerships but with
slightly different rules. See I.R.C. Subchapter S. This analysis applies to them. To the extent
that a business could be operated through a trust or a not-for-profit organization, this analysis
also applies to them.
48
Most non-corporate business organizations, including partnerships and LLCs, are not
required to pay the corporate income tax but may elect to be treated as corporations for tax
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.77-1-3.
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1120 are schedules that tally the corporation’s cost of goods sold,
compensation to corporate officers, dividend income, capital gains net
income, and depreciation, among many other tax-relevant items.49
Beyond these basic financial items, corporations must report
information about their domestic and foreign subsidiaries and, in some cases,
they must document foreign ownership.50 Given that corporations may have
hundreds or even thousands of interconnected entities, linked by complex
affiliation structures across many different tax jurisdictions, this
documentation may account for a substantial portion of their tax filings.
Corporations must also file documentation flagging certain activities and
positions that the IRS may wish to subject to additional scrutiny.51
Unlike corporations, partnerships (which for tax purposes include
LLCs and associations) are not subject to a separate tax. Instead,
partnerships are “pass-through entities” for federal tax purposes.52 All of a
partnership’s income, deductions, and credits are recorded on Form 1065 and
then allocated to its members, who must then include their allocation in their
own tax computations. Just as with corporations, several additional
schedules underlie Schedule 1065 that record relevant partnership business
activity.
Sole-proprietorships also do not have a separate tax imposed on them.
For federal tax purposes, sole-proprietorships are “disregarded entities”—
their business activity appears on the tax return of their owners.53 The
owner’s tax return includes the relevant forms that record this activity, such
as Schedule C, which reports the profit or loss from business, or Schedule F,
which reports profit or loss from farming.
The arguments in this Article in favor of eliminating business tax
privacy apply most strongly to corporations, but there are three reasons why
eliminating business tax privacy more broadly would be advantageous.
First, the vast majority of businesses in the US are partnerships for tax
purposes.54 Second, at least some corporations would consider reclassifying

49

Cost of goods sold is reported on Form 1125-A; compensation to corporate officers is
reported on Form 1125-E; dividend income is reported on Schedule C; capital gains net
income is reported in Schedule D; depreciation is reported on Form 4562.
50
This information may be found in Form 5471.
51
See, e.g., the Reportable Transactions Statement, Form 8886, on which corporations
must report certain avoidance activities; and Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Positions, on
which a corporation must report tax positions if that corporation either has created a financial
reserve for that position or plans to litigate it.
52
I.R.C. § 701.
53
Treas. Reg. § 301.77-1-3.
54
Only 5% of businesses file corporate tax returns. Corporations do, however, account
for 62% of business receipts. Lundeed & Pomerlau, supra note 14.
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as partnerships if only corporate tax privacy were eliminated.55 Third, there
are business transactions that make use of both corporate and partnership
structures to achieve favorable tax outcomes. For these transactions,
interested parties cannot see the whole picture without access to partnership
returns.56
The case for maintaining the tax privacy status quo is strongest for soleproprietorships and small partnerships, especially those that do not have
limited liability.57 The tax information of these businesses would reveal
information about the persons who owned them.58 If there were an exception
allowing some businesses to retain tax privacy, it should only apply to simple
companies—those that have no subsidiaries or affiliates, and are owned only
by a small number of individuals. Broader exceptions are too likely to be
abused. We should also be wary of any right that businesses have to redact
any content from their returns prior to publication.
For all business entities, the broadest definition of a return includes
documents transmitted to the IRS subsequent to the initial tax filing. These
documents reveal the dialogue between the IRS and the taxpayer. For
example, if the IRS believes a business’s initial return contains errors, the
IRS may send the business a notice of proposed adjustment to a tax return or
proposed changes to income. If the business agrees, it may respond with a
form consenting to the collection of deficiencies.59 If the business does not
55

Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826.
See Gladriel Shobe, Supercharged IPOs and the Up-C, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 913 (2017)
(describing several transactions that make use of corporate and partnership entities to
minimize tax liability for the business and its owners).
57
The case for tax privacy is far stronger for individuals than for corporations for at least
three reasons. First, there is a plausible public policy concern that individual tax return
information could aid criminals interested in perpetrating various pecuniary crimes. See 79
CON. REC. 2690 (1935) (statement of Rep. Robert L. Bacon) (stating concern that conmen
would use the individual return information to compile “sucker lists”). See also Pomp, supra
note 34, at 401; Income Publicity Called Kidnap Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1935, at 2. Second,
the information on an individual return would reveal far more intimate details about the
taxpayer than business tax returns would reveal about the various stakeholders in the
businesses. The sensitive information might include medical expenses, marital status, and
number of dependents. Third, the relative availability of business financial information
implies that social norms are less concerned with making business financial information
available.
58
There are some who claim that as a first principle businesses and individuals should
be entitled to the same rights under the law. Tax Executives Institute, supra note 7, at 241
(arguing that “[p]rivacy is a core American value”). There are meaningful distinctions,
however, between corporations and individuals that make the case for parity tenuous if not
specious.
59
A notice of proposed adjustment to a tax return may be made using Form 5701;
proposed changes to income may be made using Form 4549; consent to the collection of
deficiencies may be made on Form 870; Form 1120X explains the changes made in an
amended corporate return; Form 1065X explains the changes made in an amended partnership
return; Form 1040X explains the changes made in an amended individual return.
56
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agree, it may appeal to the IRS Office of Appeals and beyond that to the
federal court system.60 If the business would like to alter its initial tax filing,
it may file an amended return.61
Taken together, these documents reveal a great deal about a business.
For all businesses, they state the business’s income, deductions, and credits
and how the business arrived at those figures. For corporations, they also
state the corporation’s corporate income tax liability and how that
corporation arrived at its tax liability figure. Moreover, these documents
disclose business structures and transactions, including information about
the relevant tax jurisdictions and also subsequent interactions with the IRS.
In short, an observer would gain substantial insight into a business’s
interpretation of tax law and that business’s tax strategies.
C. The Value of Business Tax Returns
The information contained in business tax returns has value because no
publicly available records contain comparable information. No publicly
available information sheds light on business tax planning and compliance
strategies, explains the details of corporate tax liability, or even reveals what
a given corporation’s tax liability is.62
The only public documents that come close to disclosing corporate tax
liability are the financial filings that the SEC requires of public
corporations.63 Of course, only a small fraction of businesses are
corporations and only a small fraction of corporations are publicly traded.64
And even for public corporations the financial statements are a poor

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 5, YOUR APPEAL
RIGHT AND HOW TO PREPARE A PROTEST IF YOU DON’T AGREE (1999), https://www.irs.gov/pu
b/irs-pdf/p5.pdf.
61
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 556, EXAMINATION
OF RETURNS, APPEAL RIGHTS, AND CLAIMS FOR REFUND 8– 9, 11 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf.
62
There is no such thing as non-corporate business tax liability because the tax relevant
items of a business are allocated to its owners.
63
See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2016) (outlining additional details about the filing requirements
of public corporations). The financial statements do include changes in deferred tax assets
and liabilities, a global effective tax rate, net operating losses, permanently reinvested
earnings, and penalties and material risks. Blank, supra note 6, at 45–48; Michelle Hanlon,
What Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements, 56 NAT.
TAX J. 831, 838 (2003). In extreme cases, financial reporting requires some reconciliation
between the financial statements and the tax return, but even the reconciliation’s numbers
may be aggregated to the point of uselessness. Hanlon, supra, at 837. Most firms use the
indirect method for their Statement of Cash Flows, in which case the financial statements will
not reveal cash taxes paid.
64
Mary Ellen Biery, 4 Things You Don’t Know About Private Companies, FORBES (May
26, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2013/05/26/4-things-you-dont-knowabout-private-companies/#556e49dd291a.
60
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substitute for corporate tax returns for at least three reasons.65 First, financial
statements and tax returns are prepared under very different accounting
rules.66 Examples of differences include that the financial statements have
different standards for consolidation,67 are only required to show tax
information for continuing operations,68 and expense stock options as they
vest.69
Second, in most instances, discretion in disclosure rules makes it
difficult to infer exactly what the financial statement numbers mean and how
they relate to the tax return information.70 Scholars who have compared
corporations with similar business activities have found large discrepancies
between how those activities were accounted for on the financial statements
and on tax returns.71
Third, the two sets of documents are unlikely to be prepared at the same
time because the 10-K is due ninety days after the end of a firm’s fiscal
year,72 whereas the tax return need not be filed until eight and a half months
have elapsed.73 Thus when the financial statements are released, the tax
return liability need not even have been computed.
These differences matter. Regression analysis has shown a significant
disparity between financial statement and tax return numbers.74 On average,
for every dollar of current tax expense on the financial statement, there is
65
See Hanlon, supra note 63, at 831; Petro Lisowsky, Inferring U.S. Tax Liability from
Financial Statement Information, 31 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 29 (2009).
66
This is not surprising. The financial statements apply Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) to present information in a way that will help interested parties make
financial decisions. The corporate tax return records the information necessary to determine
tax liability.
67
Hanlon, supra note 63, at 845–46. Under Financial Accounting Standard 94, firms are
required to consolidate financial statements for any subsidiaries they control and report
income from any subsidiaries they have at least a 20% ownership interest in. Under I.R.C. §
1504 consolidation may be elected if the ownership interest in the subsidiary is at least 80%.
Thus, ownership stakes of between 20% and 80% may lead to different incomes due to
consolidation. For tax purposes, income is recognized when there is a dividend paid under
I.R.C. § 862.
68
See Hanlon, supra note 63, at 843.
69
Hanlon, supra note 63, at 839. Corporations may claim a deduction for employee
stock options when they are exercised under I.R.C. § 422.
70
Hanlon, supra note 63, at 836. For example, the provision for uncertain tax positions
should accrue probable tax losses and note possible tax losses, but the financial statements
are often opaque with regard to these reserves. Id at 842. There is evidence that the
requirement that firms disclose these tax reserves led more firms to settle with the IRS.
Jennifer L. Blouin, Cristi A. Gleason, Lillian Mills & Stephanie A. Sikes, Pre-empting
Disclosure? Firms’ Decisions Prior to FIN No. 48, 85 ACCT REV. 791 (2010).
71
Lisowsky, supra note 65, at 29.
72
In some cases, less than 90 days after the end of a firm’s fiscal year. 17 C.F.R. §
210.3-01 (2016).
73
I.R.C. § 6072(d). See also Hanlon, supra note 63, at 835.
74
Lisowsky, supra note 65, at 30.
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only seventy cents of tax liability on the corporate tax return.75 Anyone who
had access to financial statements, but not corporate tax returns, could at best
make a poor guess at that corporation’s tax liability.
More importantly, a business tax return reveals how a business interacts
with tax law. It sheds light on how a business decides to comply with the
requirements of tax law, how a business strategically plans its structures and
activities to minimize its tax liability, and how well that business executes
its compliance and planning strategies.76 Without access to business tax
returns, any interested party will not understand business tax compliance and
planning strategies and the execution of those strategies.
In sum, for most businesses, no tax-related information is publicly
available. For the small fraction of corporations that are publicly traded, an
interested party would be able to find financial statement tax liability—a
poor proxy for the actual tax liability stated on returns. And even with this
poor proxy, the interested party would not be able to meaningfully infer
much about a business’s tax planning and compliance strategies.
II. HIDDEN COSTS
The previous Part showed that a great deal could be learned from
business tax returns. But if business tax returns were made public, who
would use return information, how would they use it, and what ultimately
would the impact of that usage be? This Part looks at how two groups could
use business tax returns. Part IIA explains how investors could use business
tax return information to improve their financial models. Part IIB explores
how firms could use business tax return information from other firms to
improve their tax compliance and planning. The fact that investors and firms
do not have access to business tax returns causes both of these groups to
suffer adverse outcomes and results in businesses having non-uniform tax
compliance and planning. This analysis sets the stage for the discussion in
Part III about the widespread benefits of eliminating business tax privacy.
A. Suboptimal Investing
This Subpart first shows how investors use information to forecast the
future risks and returns of their investments. It then demonstrates how more
detailed business activity information would materially improve these
forecasts. This Subpart concludes by arguing that without business tax return
information, investors will make suboptimal investing decisions.

75

Id.
Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 35
(2014).
76
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1. Investing Decisions
The literature on investor behavior is extensive, and at its heart lies
portfolio theory.77 Portfolio theory explores how investors allocate their
money, often called capital, across different investments.78 The fundamental
objective of any investment is the money that investment pays out, often
called (confusingly for our purposes) a return. All other things equal,
investors prefer a higher return to a lower return. Returns are, however, not
the only consideration. Investments also vary in their risk.79 Thus investors
must weigh the risk and return of each investment opportunity before
deciding which ones are best.
One possible approach to simultaneously considering the risk and
return of an investment entails the investor adjusting the return of each
investment by a factor that accounts for the risk.80 This adjustment depends
on the preferences of the investor—some will accept more risk to increase
their return and others will not. After this adjustment, investors should aim
to allocate their capital to maximize these risk-adjusted returns.
The pursuit of better risk-adjusted returns explains most investing
behavior, from a hedge fund buying distressed debt at a discount hoping to
collect through the courts, to an individual investor picking a few stocks as
a hobby. Investors will have different beliefs about what will happen in the
market, vary in the sophistication of their methods, and span the wealth
distribution, but all are attempting to maximize their returns after adjusting
for risk.81
What makes investing challenging is that no one knows what the future
performance of a business will be. A business that performed well last year
77

See generally Harry M. Markowitz, The Early History of Portfolio Theory: 16001960, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 5 (1999); Hal Varian, A Portfolio of Nobel Laureates: Markowitz,
Miller and Sharpe, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993).
78
This literature has produced several intricate and influential mathematical models.
See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN., 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risky Assets and
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 13 (1965); Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); HAL VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 371–76 (3rd ed. 1992).
79
There are many ways to measure risk. Common metrics include standard deviation
and market beta. Whereas every investor prefers higher returns, attitudes towards risk can
vary. When selecting investments, investors may have to tradeoff between risk and return. A
typical investor will require a higher return to take on greater risk, but for the same increase
in risk different investors might require different increases in return. Varian, supra note 77,
at 177.
80
This adjustment will depend on the risk preferences of the investor. Risk-averse
investors require a higher return to take on greater risk; risk-seeking investors will bear a
lower return for access to greater risk. Id.
81
Varian, supra note 77, at 190. The exception is a risk-neutral investor, who is
indifferent to risk.
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may perform poorly this year and vice-versa.82 Thus, before investors can
optimize their portfolios, they must estimate the risk and return associated
with each investment. This entails forecasting the range of possible
outcomes for a business and the likelihood of each outcome. Sophisticated
investors make these estimations using analytical methods and highperformance computers. Other investors may simply have a gut feeling
about a particular stock, which while informal is still a forecast. But before
making an investment, all investors have a belief about that investment’s
future performance—its risk and return.
2. Information Needs
The beliefs that investors have about an investment’s future
performance do not simply appear to the investor out of thin air. Forecasting
future risks and returns requires information. The information could range
from a firm’s past financial statements, to management interviews, to an
overheard conversation on a subway, to a broadcast of Jim Cramer’s Mad
Money television show. At one extreme, an investor might have insider
information. At the other extreme, an investor might know little more than
a stock’s ticker symbol. Just as importantly, investors vary in their ability to
use information. Some have intricate computer models, some are trained
Form 10-K readers, and some have neither specialized equipment nor
training. Without information, investors cannot make forecasts—even
informal ones.83
To explore how more information could improve an investor’s forecast
of future returns, consider the following series of examples. An investor
observes that GM earned $100 in 2016 and $140 in 2017, as shown in the
table below.

82

Past performance is no guarantee of future performance. See generally, BURTON G.
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR
SUCCESSFUL INVESTING (9th ed. 2007). Of course, the arguments in this Article assume
investing returns are not entirely random and that information can improve investing
strategies.
83
More information is not necessarily better. Misinformation is unlikely to improve an
investor’s decisions and even good information could result in information overload. See,
e.g., Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information Overload: The
Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57
(2005) (looking at how information overload affects the decision to accept the default option
in retirement plans). Not every investor, however, need use information correctly to improve
investment allocation—a critical mass of investors will suffice.
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GM limited information
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

Income

$100

$140

$196

The investor is considering investing in GM and decides to forecast GM’s
2018 income to see if GM would be a profitable investment.84 Given that
GM’s income grew by 40% from 2016 and 2017, a simple but reasonable
predictive model would forecast that GM’s income will again grow 40%
from 2017 to 2018.85 In that case, the investor would forecast an income of
$196 for GM in 2018.86
Now assume that the investor has additional information about GM as
in the table below. In addition to seeing GM’s income, the investor can see
GM’s sales, manufacturing costs, and rent. GM’s income is equal to its sales
less its manufacturing costs and rent: $100 in 2016 and $140 in 2017, just as
in the limited information scenario.

GM additional information version 1
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

Sales
Manufacturing Costs
Rent

$500
-100
-300

$550
-110
-300

$605
-121
-300

Income

$100

$140

$184

Again, the investor would like to forecast GM’s 2018 income, now using this
additional information.
The investor can see that in both years
manufacturing costs as a percentage of sales were 20% and rent was fixed at

84
For simplicity, this example assumes that the income of the business entity is the
income of the investor. A more complete analysis would take into consideration all the ways
in which investors can profit from businesses, including capital gains, dividends, and share
repurchases. The simplification used in this analysis does not change the results.
85

$140−$100

= 40%.
These examples assume growth rates remain the same.
$100
Presumably a sophisticated investor’s forecast would apply mean reversion and other
principles to arrive at a superior forecast. The basic point made in these examples holds
nonetheless.
86
$140 + $140 × 40% = $196.
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$300.87 The investor can also observe that sales grew by 10% between 2016
and 2017 and can use that information to make a more sophisticated income
forecast by assuming that sales continue to grow at 10%, the cost of
manufacturing as a percentage of sales remains constant at 20%, and rent
remains $300.88 Under those assumptions, the investor would forecast 2018
sales of $605,89 manufacturing costs of $121,90 and rent of $300. Finally, by
subtracting manufacturing costs and rent from sales, the investor would
arrive at a forecast of $184 for 2018 income.91
The additional information allowed the investor to distinguish between
fixed and variable costs. The investor had evidence that rent stayed fixed
even as sales grew, but manufacturing costs grew in proportion to sales. The
first 2018 income forecast, $196, would imply at least one of the following:
(1) sales growth increased, (2) the cost of manufacturing cars decreased, or
(3) the rent decreased.92 Since there is no basis for any of those assumptions,
the second forecast is likely better.93
Being able to distinguish between fixed and variable costs is not the
only benefit that arises from having access to more detailed information. To
see why, consider a different additional information scenario, as shown in
the table below, in which the investor observes that GM had one-time lawsuit
income of $80 in 2017. GM’s recurring income is equal to its sales less its
manufacturing costs and rent: $100 in 2016 and $60 in 2017, but GM also
has the lawsuit income in 2017. Taking the lawsuit income into account,
GM has total income of $100 in 2016 and $140 in 2017, just as in the limited
information scenario.

87

$100

88

$500
$550−$500

= 20%;

$500
89
90
91
92
93

$110
$550

= 20%.

= 10% is the rate of sales growth.

$550 + $550 × 10% = $605.
$605 × 20% = $121.
$605 − $121 − $300 = $184.
Assuming no other sources of income or cost.
The two estimates differ by

$196−$184
$184

= 6.5%.
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GM additional information version 2
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

Sales
Manufacturing Costs
Rent

$500
-100
-300

$450
-90
-300

$405
-81
-300

Recurring income
Lawsuit income

$100
+0

$60
+80

$24
+0

Total income

$100

$140

$24

Again, the investor would like to forecast GM’s 2018 income. The investor
can see that in both years manufacturing costs as a percentage of sales were
20% and rent was fixed at $300.94 Now, the investor observes that sales fell
10% between 2016 and 2017 and can use that information to make a more
sophisticated income forecast by assuming that sales continue to fall at 10%,
the cost of manufacturing as a percentage of sales remains constant at 20%,
and rent remains at $300.95 Under those assumptions, the investor would
forecast 2018 sales of $405,96 manufacturing costs of $81,97 and rent of $300.
Finally, by subtracting manufacturing costs and rent from sales, the investor
would arrive at a forecast of $24 for 2018 income.98
The additional information allowed the investor to distinguish between
recurring and non-recurring income. GM’s total income did grow between
2016 and 2017, but that was only because it received one-time lawsuit
income in 2017. Its recurring income was in fact decreasing, but this would
have not have been apparent without the additional information.
In all three examples, GM’s 2016 and 2017 income was the same. Yet,
in each example, the forecasted 2018 income was very different. More
information changed the forecast, likely making it more accurate. In the first
additional information scenario, the improvement came from forecasting
more elements forward—being able to distinguish between fixed costs and
variable costs. In the second additional information scenario, the
improvement came from being able to distinguish between one-time and
94

$100

95

$500
$450−$500

= 20%;

$500
96
97
98

$90
$450

= 20%.

= −10% is the rate of sales growth (or decline in this case).

$450 − $450 × 10% = $405.
$405 × 20% = $81.
$405 − $81 − $300 = $24.
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recurring items. These examples used fairly simple forecasting methods, but
the same theory applies to more intricate models. More relevant, accurate
information used appropriately will yield better forecasts.
The above examples focused on forecasting income, but more
information also improves the estimates of all financial measures, including
risk. Measuring risk is more involved because it requires forecasting
multiple possible future outcomes and also estimating how likely each of
those possible future outcomes is. More information would make it easier
to determine what these possible future outcomes might be and also their
likelihood. For example, more information about all of GM’s car product
lines would allow an investor to forecast how the price of oil would affect
each of its products. The investor could then determine how much GM
would benefit from declining oil prices or be harmed by increasing oil prices,
ultimately using that information to estimate GM’s risk related to the price
of oil.
3. Tax Information
Additional tax information is no different: it would improve investors’
estimates of the risks and returns associated with different investments. Tax
return information would make it easier to forecast future tax liability and it
would also provide otherwise unobservable data that would aid in the
forecasting of sales, costs, and many other relevant financial measures.
Similarly, tax return information would help an investor uncover how risky
the tax strategies of a business are, and it would also make it easier to
estimate many other risks.
Tax information would be particularly useful for investors that invest
in publicly traded corporations, a roughly $30 trillion market.99 When an
investor is interested in investing in a small LLC, that LLC might well allow
the investor to review its tax returns. An investor making a similar request
of Facebook would be ignored. Investors of modest means may benefit
disproportionally from eliminating business tax privacy because they tend to
invest heavily in publicly traded equities.100
Estimating future tax liability comes with its own challenges because a
medley of interrelated factors determines a corporation’s tax liability. Some
corporations with low effective tax rates today will have low effective tax
rates in the future. For example, firms in industries that have easy access to
tax credits and deductions will have lower effective tax rates today and

99

WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=
2018&locations=US&start=2010&view=chart (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
100
Even if investors of modest means do not understand how to use tax return information
in their investing, they may invest in mutual funds that do.
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tomorrow.101 This also applies to firms that can consistently use effective
tax sheltering strategies, especially multinational firms that can shift
business activity to lower tax jurisdictions.102 In contrast, firms that have
abnormally large deductions and credits today will have different effective
tax rates tomorrow. This is especially true for firms that find ways of
frontloading their deduction claims, which causes not only an unusually low
tax liability today, but also an unusually high tax liability tomorrow.
The following examples demonstrate some of the ways that tax
information could improve investor forecasts. An investor observes that
Apple earned $80 in 2016 and $120 in 2017, as shown in the table below.

Apple limited information
Year
After-tax income

2016

2017

Forecast

$80

$120

$180

The investor is considering investing in Apple and decides to forecast
Apple’s 2018 income to see if Apple would be a profitable investment.
Given that Apple’s income grew by 50% from 2016 to 2017, it would be
reasonable to assume that Apple’s income will again grow 50% from 2017
to 2018.103 In that case, the investor would forecast an income of $180 for
Apple in 2018.104
Now assume that the investor has additional information about Apple.
As in the table below, the investor also sees Apple’s pre-tax income, its tax
liability, and its 2017 retirement plan startup tax credit of $5.105 Apple’s
after-tax income is equal to its pre-tax income less its taxes, plus any credits:
$80 in 2016 and $120 in 2017, just as in the limited information scenario.

101
These businesses include those engaged in qualified research and development (I.R.C.
§ 41) and oil exploration (I.R.C. § 45I).
102
The shifting of income to low-tax jurisdictions is often called “base erosion and profit
shifting” or “BEPS” for short. See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
OECD PUBLISHING (Jul. 19, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en.
103

$120−$80

= 50%. These examples assume growth rates remain the same. Presumably
a sophisticated investor’s forecast would apply mean reversion and other principles to arrive
at a superior forecast. The basic point made in these examples holds nonetheless.
104
$120 + $120 × 50% = $180.
105
I.R.C. § 45E. Eligible employers may claim a credit of up to 50% of the qualified
start-up costs of an employer provided pension using Form 8881. This credit is only available
to small businesses, so Apple would probably not qualify.
$80
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Apple additional information
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

Pre-tax income
25% Corporate tax liability
Retirement plan startup credit

$100
-25
+5

$160
-40
+0

$256
-64
+0

$80

$120

$192

After-tax income

Again, the investor would like to forecast Apple’s 2018 income. Now, the
investor observes that pre-tax income grew by 60% between 2016 and
2017.106 Assuming that income before taxes continued to grow at a 60%
percent rate, Apple’s 2018 pre-tax income would be $256,107 Apple’s tax
would be $64,108 and Apple’s after-tax income would be $192.109 The
additional information changed the forecast, making it more accurate,
because it allowed the investor to separate the recurring and non-recurring
portions of taxes owed.110
In the Apple example, the investor observed something about the
company from its tax information that would likely not be available on its
Form 10-K: Apple is creating a retirement plan. With a more sophisticated
financial model, the investor could also use this information to improve
forecasts by considering Apple’s ability to recruit good employees—
presumably the retirement plan will be attractive to potential employees—
and the increased costs associated with operating the retirement plan.111
Tax information can also improve forecasts of non-tax items, such as
sales, as demonstrated in the following example. An investor observes that
Disney earned $185 in 2016 and $184 in 2017, as shown in the table below.

106

$160−$100
$100

107
108
109
110
111

= 60% is the rate of pre-tax income growth.

$160 + $160 × 60% = $256.
$256 × 25% = $64.
$256 − $64 = $192.
The two estimates differ by

$180−$192
$192

= −6.25%.

Some investors do take this information into account. For example, the Parnassus
Endeavor Fund invests in companies with “outstanding workplaces.” PARNASSUS
INVESTMENTS 8 (2015), https://cdn.parnassus.com/downloads/funds/ParnassusFundsBrochur
e.pdf.
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Disney limited information
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

After-tax income

$185

$184

$183

The investor is considering investing in Disney and decides to forecast
Disney’s 2018 income to determine whether Disney would be a profitable
investment. Given that Disney’s income decreased by approximately .5%
from 2016 to 2017, it would be reasonable to assume that Disney’s income
will again decrease by approximately .5% from 2017 to 2018.112 In that case,
the investor would forecast an income of $183 for Disney in 2018.113
Now assume the investor has additional information about Disney.114
As in the table below, the investor sees Disney’s pre-tax income and the taxes
Disney paid to California and Florida. Disney’s after-tax income is equal to
its pre-tax income less its taxes: $185 in 2016 and $184 in 2017, just as in
the limited information scenario.

Disney additional information
Year

2016

2017

Pre-tax income
10% California tax
5% Florida tax

$200
-10
-5

$200
-12
-4

After-tax income

$185

$184

The investor can use this additional information to deduce how much of
Disney’s income was in California and how much was in Florida.
As shown in the table below, because the California tax rate is 10% and
Disney paid $10 in California taxes in 2016 and $12 in California taxes in
2017, the investor can deduce California income: $100 in 2016 and $120 in
2017.115 Similarly, the investor can deduce Florida income: $100 in 2016

112

$184−$185

113

$184 − $184 × .5% = $183, rounded to the nearest integer.
For simplicity, assume also that the only costs Disney incurs are the state corporate

$185
114

= −.5%.

taxes.
115

10% of $100 is $10, so California income must be $100 in 2016; 10% of $120 is $12,
so California income must be $120 in 2017.
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and $80 in 2017.116

Disney additional information
Year

2016

2017

Forecast

California income
Florida income

$100
100

$120
80

$144.0
64.0

Pre-tax income
10% California tax
5% Florida tax

$200
-10
-5

$200
-12
-4

$208.0
-14.4
3.2

After-tax income

$185

$184

$190.4

The investor can find separate growth rates for California and Florida
income. From 2016 to 2017, California income grew by 20% and Florida
income fell by 20%.117 Assuming that California income continues to grow
at the same rate of 20%, it will be $144 in 2018.118 Assuming that Florida
income continues to decline at the same rate of 20%, it will be $64 in 2018.119
At those income levels, 2018 California taxes will be $14.4 and 2018 Florida
taxes will be $3.2.120 Thus, the projected total income for 2018 will be
$190.4.121
The additional information improved the investor’s 2018 forecast of tax
liability and also allowed the investor to compute two separate income
growth rates, which would likely be more accurate than computing one
company-wide income growth rate.122 Perhaps even more importantly, the
investor gained additional understanding of Disney’s strategy regarding
where it plans to expand its business.123
The examples thus far have focused on the investor’s forecast of future
income, but tax information can also inform investors about the risks
associated with investing in a corporation. As a final example, consider an
116

5% of $100 is $5, so Florida income must be $100 in 2016; 5% of $80 is $4, so Florida
income must be $80 in 2017.
117

$120−$100
$100

118
119
120
121
122
123

= 20%;

$80−$100
$100

= −20%.

$120 + $120 × 20% = $144.
$80 − $80 × 20% = $64.
$144 × 10% = $14.4 and $64 × 5% = $3.2.
$144 − $14.4 + $64 − $3.2 = $190.4.
The two estimates differ by

$183−$190.4
$190.4

= −3.89%.

Disney’s competitors will also have access to this information. See infra Part IIIC2
for further analysis of this issue.

2019]

CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY

51

investor who observes, as shown in the table below, that Google had pre-tax
income of $100 in both 2016 and 2017; taxes of $25 in 2016 and $20 in 2017;
and, thus, after-tax income of $75 in 2016 and $80 in 2017.

Google limited information
Year

2016

2017

Pre-tax income
Corporate income tax liability

$100
-25

$100
-20

$75

$80

After-tax income

The investor observes that Google’s effective tax rate was 25% in 2016
but only 20% in 2017.124 Given only this information, the investor will not
know why the effective tax rate decreased from 2016 to 2017. If the investor
cannot see why Google’s effective tax rate changed, the investor will have a
worse estimate of Google’s future tax liability and a worse estimate of
Google’s future tax risk.
With more information, the investor could understand what the
decrease in effective tax rate implies for Google’s future. The decreased
effective tax rate in 2017 would, for example, have different return and risk
implications if it were caused by a one-time credit as opposed to Google
adopting a risky tax avoidance strategy. If the 2017 effective tax rate were
smaller because of a one-time credit, then 25% is probably a better
approximation of Google’s future tax rate. If the lower effective tax rate
were caused by a risky tax avoidance strategy, which the IRS would likely
contest, then the best approximation of Google’s future tax rate would
depend on the probability that Google prevails over the IRS and the penalties
Google would face if it did not prevail. With a risky tax avoidance strategy,
the best forecast of Google’s tax rate might be lower than 25%, but investing
in Google would also carry more risk because the outcome of the possible
dispute with IRS would be uncertain.
The utility of tax return information to investors is not merely
theoretical. In practice, the absence of tax information causes analysts to
arrive at vastly different valuations for the same company—differences that
can total tens of billions of dollars.125 But because financial statements do
124

$25
$100

125

= 25%;

$20
$100

= 20%.

Morris Pearl, How Companies Like Apple Dodge Taxes and Their Own Investors, N.Y.
TIMES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/opinion/how-companies-likeapple-dodge-taxes-and-their-own-investors.html (describing how two analysts came up with
valuations $28 billion dollars apart for Dell, despite using similar methods, largely because

52

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:27

not contain much information about the riskiness of tax strategies, it is
impossible to tell in most cases if a firm’s effective tax rate is low because
of a credit or a tax shelter.126 Investors remain in the dark.
B. Suboptimal Business Tax Planning and Compliance
Investors are not the only ones that would eagerly scrutinize business
tax returns. Businesses would also be keen to take a look. This Subpart
considers the effect of eliminating business tax privacy on firms. It first
shows how even similar firms will have different tax outcomes because (1)
firms have different tax strategies, (2) firms make different judgments about
how to record tax-relevant transactions, and (3) some firms are more inclined
to err in their accounting than others. This Subpart then shows how public
access to returns would allow firms to compare their returns to other firms,
enabling each firm to find the best tax strategies, apply most appropriate taxrelevant judgments, and catch accounting errors. Ultimately, the flow of tax
information between firms would make tax compliance and planning more
uniform across firms. Without access to business tax returns, businesses will
have disparate tax outcomes, which will cause economic distortions that are
discussed in Part III.
1. Variation in Business Tax Outcomes
Under the Internal Revenue Code, business activities receive different
tax treatment based on the location, timing, and character of those activities.
For example, investment in opportunity zones, research and development
expenses, and qualified oil and gas production all receive favorable tax
treatment.127
Even identical businesses, however, subject to the same laws, prepare
substantially different returns. In an annual experiment, Money Magazine
consistently found that different tax experts given the same information
prepared substantially different tax returns.128 This should come as no
they made different assumptions about the company’s overseas taxes). There is also evidence
that firms facing tax uncertainty delay large capital investments. Martin Jacob, Kelly
Wentland & Scott Wentland, Real Effects of Tax Uncertainty: Evidence from Firm Capital
Investments (Apr. 11, 2019) (working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id-2518243. That information would certainly be valuable to investors.
126
Hanlon, supra note 63, at 844.
127
Businesses that invest in opportunity zones, I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018), have qualified
research and development costs, § 41, and produce oil or gas from marginal wells, § 45I, are
entitled to favorable tax treatment.
128
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 229 (5th ed. 2017) (citing several
studies from Money Magazine). See also Joel Slemrod, The Costs of Tax Complexity:
Presentation to the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Return 5 (March 3, 2005).
See, e.g., Lisa De Simone, John R. Robinson & Bridget Stomberg, Distilling the Reserve for
Uncertain Tax Positions: The Revealing Case of Black Liquor, 19 REV. ACCOUNT STUD. 456
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surprise. Tax compliance and planning are neither trivial nor perfunctory.
Firms must record and categorize the multitudinous tax-relevant transactions
they execute every day. Moreover, the size of the tax code combined with
its opaque nature renders compliance hardly a simple matter of course.129
When the incentive to minimize tax liability is added to the mix, actualized
by tax practitioners of varying skill and moral fiber, we should be surprised
whenever two businesses do manage to have the same effective tax rate,130
let alone the same tax strategies.
If, however, business tax returns were public, every firm could compare
its tax return to other firms’ returns. Whenever a firm found discrepancies,
it could take a close look, learn from the discrepancy, and if advantageous
modify its tax planning and compliance strategy and execution.
2. Firm Learning
There are many ways to categorize the causes of disparate business tax
outcomes.131 This section describes three (strategy, discretion, and error)
and explains how eliminating business tax privacy and allowing firms to
learn from one another would reduce disparate business tax outcomes.132
Strategy. The Internal Revenue Code creates many opportunities for
businesses to decrease their tax liability with careful tax planning. Common
legal strategies to reduce tax liability include manipulating the timing of
transactions, strategically structuring business transactions, preferring

(2014) (detailing how nineteen corporations accounted for a refundable excise tax credit in
very different ways); Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62 (estimating the distribution of tax
mistakes that small firms make).
129
The US government itself seems unsure of how long the Code is: “The tax code has
grown so long that it has become challenging even to figure out how long it is. A search of
the Code conducted using the ‘word count’ feature in Microsoft Word turned up nearly four
million words.” TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 1 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2012),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf.
130
The simplest way to think about tax variation is as variation in effective tax rates.
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =
. Using ETRs (which are average rates) simplifies the
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒

analysis and captures the essential intuition. The complete picture is much more complicated.
In theory, the marginal rate should drive decision making in the primary market for capital,
but the average rate should drive decision making in the secondary market for capital. Further
complicating matters, because most investments yield returns over several periods, there are
in fact several marginal tax and average tax rates that may be relevant.
131
One possible partition is error, avoidance, evasion, discretion, and chance. These are
not always clearly defined and distinct, but the following demarcations offer a starting point:
error and chance are unintentional, but error requires that available information is neglected
or misused; avoidance and evasion are intentional; avoidance is at least plausibly legal;
evasion requires concealing information from the tax authority and is illegal; and judgment
implies that reasonable minds could differ on, for example, the correct application of law or
the correct forecast of a financial item.
132
Part IIIB2 infra discusses why this is beneficial for the economy at large.
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certain forms of financing, and shifting income to more tax-favorable
jurisdictions.133 Many of these strategies require complex transactions and
an intricate network of affiliated business entities. Some of these strategies
are legal, some are illegal, and some fall into a grey area, in which the IRS
and a firm (or even different firms) might disagree about a particular
application of tax law.134
While many of these strategies are widely understood, the devil is in
the details, and it would be a mistake to assume that business tax strategy is
uniform across firms. Indeed, some corporations are well known to be more
effective at tax planning than others. For many years, GE’s tax department
employed nearly 1,000 people and was called the world’s best tax law
firm.135 Moreover, while many of the largest corporations have access to the
same cadre of accounting and law firms, many smaller businesses do not.136
133

Stock repurchases and dividend payments both return capital to investors. These two
transactions, however, are not identical from the perspective of the investors for tax purposes.
Repurchases may trigger capital gains taxes and dividends may trigger dividend taxes—
depending on the situation, one may be preferred to the other. Toward the end of a tax year,
it may be advantageous to shift revenue recognition from the coming year to the current one
if rates are expected to be higher in the following year. Interest from debt obligations may be
deductible, but dividend payments are not. I.R.C. § 163 (2018). From a corporate tax
standpoint, using debt instead of equity financing is thus an avoidance activity. Because
equity has non-tax advantages, there are financial advisors that design instruments that
resemble debt for tax purposes and equity for non-tax purposes.
134
A typical example is transfer pricing, especially when intellectual property is involved.
Microsoft, for example, sold intellectual property to a subsidiary in a lower tax jurisdiction.
The subsidiary then used the intellectual property to generate profit. The original sale was
subject to US taxes and the subsequent profit was subject to foreign tax law (until the
subsidiary pays a dividend to Microsoft). The price of the original sale effectively determined
the allocation of taxable income between these two jurisdictions. Although there was
uncertainty over the value of the intellectual property, Microsoft had a strong incentive to
estimate the value to be as small as possible. Even though the profits belong to the subsidiary,
they may be loaned to the parent company for periods less than 60 days. Rolling over these
loans, HP, for example, was able to effectively repatriate billions. Corporate Tax Avoidance:
The Price Isn’t Right, THE ECONOMIST: THE SCHUMPETER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012),
https://www.economist.com/schumpeter/2012/09/21/the-price-isnt-right.
135
David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html. The
claim that GE paid no taxes was sensationalized by the press and some politicians. Robert
Farley, Warren: GE Pays No Taxes, FACT CHECK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.factcheck.org
/2012/04/warren-ge-pays-no-taxes/. GE paid no taxes because it sustained an enormous loss
from the collapse of GE Capital during the Great Recession. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, The Truth
About GE’s Tax Bill, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2011/04/04/thetruth-about-ges-tax-bill/. GE has recently fallen on harder times and has slashed the number
of tax professionals it employees. Neil Amato, 600 Tax Professionals Moving to PWC, J.
ACCOUNTANCY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2017/jan/pwcto-add-ge-tax-team-201715836.html.
136
The four largest accounting firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and KPMG, are collectively known as the “Big Four.” Michael
Rapoport, Big Four Accounting Firms’ Revenue Rise 10.4%, Strongest Growth in Years,
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Thus, although there is variation in tax strategy between similarly sized
firms, the variation across all firms (from those with the most innovative tax
planning to those with little or none at all) is far more substantial.
With public access to returns, firms could learn about the tax strategies
of other firms. They could reverse engineer some of the compliance,
sheltering, and preparation decisions of other firms.137 In particular, they
could learn about each other’s inter-party transactions,138 see which activities
and jurisdictions other firms are using for tax sheltering purposes, and learn
about transfer pricing arrangements.139 By looking at the documents filed
with the IRS subsequent to the original return, firms could also learn about
what the IRS contests and what it does not and modify their tax strategies
accordingly.140 As each firm applied what it learned from other firms, tax
strategies would become more uniform across firms.
Discretion. Complying with tax law requires firms to make many
judgment calls. The Internal Revenue Code is filled with ambiguities, and
tax cases often point taxpayers in different directions.141 Businesses may,
for example, expense bad debts, but deciding what proportion of debts will
be uncollectable is not an exact science and reasonable minds may differ.142
Business taxpayers also use discretion with non-substantive issues, such as
what to disclose to the IRS.
In the long run, many judgments are overridden. Accountants must
guess in the financial statements what fraction of debts that will not be
collected, but that estimate will ultimately be replaced by the actual fraction
of debts that the business is unable to collect. Similarly, accountants must
guess how a dispute with the IRS will be resolved, but ultimately that
forecast will be replaced by the actual outcome of the dispute.
Nonetheless, variation in discretion could make two otherwise similar
firms appear very different in a given year. Consider, for example, two firms
that were identical except for their accounting practices, with the more
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-four-accounting-firmsrevenue-rises-10-4-strongest-growth-in-years-11544713625.
137
See supra Part IIB and Part IIC; Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 821;
Blank, supra note 6, at 62–69.
138
Blank, supra note 6, at 90.
139
Id. at 91.
140
Id. at 94–95.
141
For example, the IRS has the authority to reclassify debt as equity. I.R.C. § 385
(2018). The Internal Revenue Code and accompanying regulations contain several
ambiguities, so Common Law standards have emerged from the various cases dealing with
reclassification. These Common Law standards, however, are not uniformly applied, and in
many plausible cases a taxpayer may not have much certainty about the likelihood of
reclassification. STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 122–37 (9th ed. 2016).
142
I.R.C. § 166 (2018).
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aggressive one consistently estimating that a higher fraction of debts would
be collected. The more aggressive firm would appear more profitable until,
potentially years later, the actual collections would require the aggressive
firm to adjust its accounting. Moreover, judgments about what to disclose
to the IRS are likely to consistently favor those companies that disclose just
enough to avoid additional scrutiny but no more.
With public access, a company would gain insight into the judgments
other companies have made. This includes financial items like bad debts and
what disclosures to make to the IRS.143 As companies learned from one
another, judgment calls would likely become more uniform across
companies. No company would have an incentive to make aggressive
judgment calls that might call attention to itself, nor would companies feel
compelled to be diffident if they could observe typical behavior. As
judgments become normalized, financial measures would better reflect firm
business activities and not their discretion.
Error. Given that companies must record myriad transactions, it
should come as no surprise that errors often appear in business tax
accounting.144 According to a Bloomberg survey, tax errors caused 16% of
firms to suffer unfavorable adjustments, 11% to miss tax breaks, and 7% to
grossly miscalculate tax provisions.145 Some of these errors arose from
information mismanagement, including incorrectly manually entering tax
relevant data, accidentally deleting Microsoft Excel formulas designed to
compute taxes, and overwriting tax relevant data.146 Other errors arose from
an accidental failure to comply with tax law, for example by prematurely
closing books, adjusting asset values for past years without making all the
necessary adjustments for subsequent years, writing off business units that
still had value, and prematurely expensing deferred compensation.147
143

For example, under the financial accounting reporting requirements, corporations must
create financial reserves for uncertain tax positions. These reserves account for the possibility
that the corporation does not prevail in a tax dispute with the IRS. Tax law requires
corporations that create a reserve to disclose it to the IRS on Schedule UTP. Since, however,
the reserve is created at the discretion of the corporation, corporations may vary substantially
in what they disclose. Blank, supra note 6, at 93. With public access to tax returns,
corporations would develop a much better sense of what the disclosure norms are.
144
See BLOOMBERG BNA, TOP TAX & ACCOUNTING MISTAKES THAT COST COMPANIES
MILLIONS (2015) (conducting a survey of 200 in-house tax and accounting professionals at
firms with revenues greater than one billion dollars). Errors vary across industries. Financial
services firms are most likely to close books before collecting the necessary data; healthcare
firms are most likely to struggle with city-specific regulations; and manufacturing firms have
the greatest difficulty with depreciation and asset value issues. Id. In the individual income
tax context, people also make errors, including not claiming credits. See Bhargava & Manoli,
supra note 5, at 3489.
145
See BLOOMBERG, supra note 144.
146
Id.
147
Additional common errors include incorrectly applying unitary state tax rules, failing
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In some cases, these errors are detected quickly and corrected and
ultimately do not affect the economic position of the company. Other times,
however, the company is not so lucky. The detected errors can result in
penalties or forgone benefits, affecting the economic circumstances of the
firm. If errors are never detected, they will also have an effect on the firm
by either permanently increasing or decreasing firm value.
With public access, if a business made a mistake in an Excel
spreadsheet or neglected to claim a deduction, it would be far easier to detect.
That company could compare its numbers to similar businesses, using their
returns as a check. If certain isolated numbers or ratios were substantially
different, the company could take a closer look for errors.
3. Towards Tax Uniformity
In the age of machine learning, firms would not be limited to side-byside comparisons between tax returns. With public access, software
developers could easily write algorithms that could process tax return
information.148 This software could highlight suboptimal tax strategies,
overly aggressive or diffident judgment calls, and accounting errors.
Activist investors might serve as a catalyst by investing in firms with
relatively poor tax performance and increasing shareholder value by
upgrading tax performance, further homogenizing business tax outcomes.149
This would level the playing field between companies and limit the
advantages any one could gain over others by being more tax savvy. Part III
discusses why this is beneficial for the economy at large.
While eliminating business tax privacy would move companies towards
tax uniformity, it is unlikely that it would make tax compliance, planning,
and execution perfectly uniform across firms for at least three reasons. First,
managers vary in their moral fiber and risk preferences.150 Some choose to
evade taxes by filing false returns, some choose to push the envelope with

to keep up with or comply with city-specific tax rules, failing to comply with state tax law
when deducting dividends, and not reconciling partnership earnings with past earnings
estimates. The errors seem to stem from two sources: uninterested management and the
limited input solicited from tax professionals in the design of the accounting systems. Id.
148
Machine learning is “capable of identifying highly complex patterns in large datasets.”
James Zou, Mikael Huss, Abubakar Abid, Pejman Mohammadi, & Ali Torkamani, A Primer
on Deep Learning in Genomics, 51 NATURE GENETICS 12, 12 (2019), https://www.nature.com
/articles/s41588-018-0295-5#auth-6. The universe of business tax returns may be complex
but is far simpler than the human genome.
149
Blank, supra note 6, at 38.
150
Clearly not every CEO will go to the extreme of former Enron CEO, Jeffrey Skilling.
Matt Stevens & Matthew Haag, Jeffrey Skilling, Former Enron Chief, Released After 12 Years
in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/business/enronceo-skilling-scandal.html?searchResultPosition=1.
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aggressive tax strategies, and some choose to play it safe.151 Examining a
false return will clearly not reveal that company’s true tax strategies, and a
risk-averse manager is unlikely to adopt the aggressive tax strategies that
could be gleaned from other returns. Nonetheless, eliminating business tax
privacy would get more eyes on tax returns, making tax evasion more
difficult.152 And over the long-term, the range in tax risk-taking would
decrease as aggressive tax planning would be publicly disciplined by the IRS
and diffident tax planning would be publicly disciplined by investors
pushing companies to more tax efficient strategies.
Second, some tax shelters are particularly well suited to multinational
corporations. Businesses without affiliates in foreign countries will not be
able to take advantage of transfer pricing to limit their tax liability.153 There
is anecdotal evidence, however, that with a little legal wizardry even small
domestic firms have found ways of using international tax sheltering
strategies.154
Third, dumb luck can affect a firm’s effective tax rate. Consider, for
example, two identical firms. One makes a large capital expenditure on
December 31, 2016, and the other makes the same large capital expenditure
on January 1, 2017. If Congress enacts a new tax provision that offers a
substantial credit for capital expenditures made in 2017, then the second firm
would have a lower 2017 effective tax rate. Eliminating business tax privacy
will do little to even the blows of fortune.
All in all, tax privacy is a substantial barrier preventing firms from
having the same tax outcomes—it essentially allows different firms to play
by different tax rules. Eliminating business tax privacy would decrease this
tax variation across firms. With public access, if a company found
substantial inconsistencies, it could take a closer look to see if it had missed
a tax avoidance opportunity, come to a different judgment regarding a tax
151
Tax evasion is illegal and typically involves either deliberately underreporting income
or over reporting deductible expenses. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXAMPLES OF
CORPORATE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS – FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/compl
iance/criminal-investigation/examples-of-general-tax-fraud-investigations-fiscal-year-2015.
The IRS estimates that in 2006 there was $67 billion of underreporting corporate tax liability,
most of which was evasion. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GAP “MAP” TAX YEAR 2006
(2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf. It is worth noting that
these numbers represent the position of the IRS and are not undisputed.
152
Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62.
153
Corporate Tax Avoidance: The Price Isn’t Right, THE ECONOMIST: THE SCHUMPETER
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/schumpeter/2012/09/21/the-price-isntright.
154
See Adam Sherwin, Crickhowell: Welsh Town Moves ‘Offshore’ to Avoid Tax on
Local Business, INDEPENDENT, (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/cric
khowell-welsh-town-moves-offshore-to-avoid-tax-on-local-business-a672897.1html
(describing the local businesses in a Welsh town that used international tax sheltering
strategies to minimize their tax liability).
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issue, or made an error. Over time, this learning process would make tax
planning and compliance strategies more homogenous across firms.
III. A WORLD WITHOUT BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY
The preceding Part explained how investors and businesses could use
business tax return information. This Part argues that eliminating business
tax privacy will improve the allocation of economic resources in three ways.
First, the more information investors have, the better they can direct their
investment towards productive businesses. Second, the more firms can learn
from other firms, the more uniform tax planning and compliance will be
across businesses, allowing businesses to compete for investment based on
their productivity and not their tax-savviness. Third, the more firms can
learn from other firms, the fewer resources they will expend on tax
compliance and planning strategies, leaving more resources available for
other activities that are more valuable to society.
A. Economic Efficiency
This Subpart shows how investing in the most profitable businesses
generally leads to good productivity outcomes. It also argues that freely
flowing information helps productivity, setting the stage for the discussion
of how business tax privacy is bad for productivity.155
1. Profitability and Productivity
Businesses need investment to, among many other things, fund
purchases of new assets, expand into new markets, develop innovative
products, and pay off large expiring debts.156 In today’s competitive global
markets, few if any businesses could survive long without at least
intermittent external financing. In the direst circumstance, a business with
no appeal to investors would be dissolved and its assets would be distributed.
Investors ultimately decide which businesses get what resources, and
investors prefer the businesses that are most profitable.157 Fortunately for
the economy, productivity and profitability are linked. When a company
produces something valuable, it makes a profit. Thus, the profit motive often
leads to the most productive companies receiving the most investment.158
155

For the purposes of this Article, efficiency is efficiency in allocation. See KRUGMAN
& WELLS, supra note 18, at 29.
156
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLE OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 2-4 (12th ed. 2017).
157
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 156, at 7–9.
158
Other factors may also play a role in investing decisions, such as the labor or
environmental practices of a corporation. These factors, however, have a small effect
compared to the profit motive, and many of these factors are entangled with the profit motive.
For example, investors may prefer corporations that have high labor standards because they
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The profit motive helps direct resources to the most productive use, but
most unconstrained markets are flawed.159 Private incentives alone will not
put society’s resources to their best use—or in economists’ lingo, private
incentives alone will not achieve economic efficiency.160 If externalities
from production and consumption are uncorrected or a monopoly sets prices
above marginal cost, then the affected market is not efficient.161 How can
society’s resources be at their best use when production decisions do not
account for pollution and monopolies extract surplus from consumers? This
is where law has a role to play. Law can change the relative profitability of
different business activities. Government can use regulations and taxes to
steer businesses towards, for example, environmentally friendly products or
production methods or limit the power of monopolies.
A less conspicuous way in which government has an enormous impact
on economic efficiency is by exerting control over the exchange of private
information. Obvious examples include patents,162 which are made publicly
available, and mandated SEC reporting.163 Government is also a store of an
incredible amount of information, which it may or may not choose to publish,
including business tax returns. Properly designed government intervention
can help steer a market towards efficiency, but government policies can also
have adverse impacts on the efficiency of markets. This may be by design.
Most governments willingly trade some economic efficiency for a more
equitable distribution of resources.164 But some policies decrease efficiency
with no apparent equity upside. Business tax privacy is one such policy.

believe that the law will eventually require corporations to meet those standards or because
there is a reward from consumers or other stakeholders for exceptional labor or environmental
practices.
159
See VARIAN, supra note 78, at 233, 432 for a theoretical analysis of the economic harm
of monopoly power and externalities.
160
Economic efficiency is good for everyone on average. It means better returns for
investors, more technological development, lower prices, and higher wages. But economic
efficiency does not take into consideration equity issues. Income distribution is important,
and most people would gladly give up some efficiency for a more equitable income
distribution. The million-dollar question is how much efficiency should be traded for a more
equitable income distribution. This is a matter of value judgments: people can come to equally
coherent but differing conclusions about this tradeoff. I am not addressing equity concerns in
this Article mainly because the available evidence on the equity consequences of business tax
privacy is inconclusive.
161
See VARIAN, supra note 78, at 233, 432 for a theoretical analysis of the economic harm
of externalities and monopoly power externalities.
162
35 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2018).
163
17 C.F.R. §210 (2016).
164
For example, the most economically efficient tax system would collect the same in
taxes from every person regardless of their income. No country in the world has adopted this
lump-sum tax to collect substantial revenue. Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 128, at 237.
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2. An Illustration of Economic Efficiency
Before describing how business tax privacy impairs economic
efficiency, it will be helpful to provide an illustration of how the profit
motive moves resources to their best use. For now, assume the flow of
information between businesses and between investors and businesses is
unconstrained. The next Subpart relaxes this assumption and explores how
impeding information flows with business tax privacy has an adverse effect
on the allocation of society’s resources.
Consider an investor who can invest in two corporations, Ford and GM.
The investor may allocate investment between the two corporations however
the investor likes.165 Ford and GM use the investment to produce
environmentally friendly cars.166 The following table shows how investment
in Ford increases both the number of cars Ford produces and Ford’s income.
For ease of analysis, assume that each car generates $1 of income.

Ford investment schedule
Investment

Cars manufactured

Income

$0
1
2
3
4
5

0
6
11
15
18
20

$0
6
11
15
18
20

Notice that cars manufactured and pre-tax income increase with
investment.167
Assume GM has the following investment, cars
manufactured, and income schedule.

165

Assume that the investor rounds to the nearest dollar.
The cars are environmentally friendly so that the example is not complicated by
negative externalities. Assume that marginal car production is decreasing in investment for
both firms. In other words, the first dollar of investment will produce more cars than the
second dollar, which will produce more cars than the third dollar, so on and so forth. This is
a standard assumption in economics. It tends to be correct because the resources best suited
for a given production activity are the ones first used for that production activity. As the best
resources are used up, less suitable ones are used which decreases marginal productivity. In
the absence of this assumption, it might be optimal for the investor to only choose one
business to invest in.
167
Notice also that each additional dollar of investment generates fewer cars—the first
dollar of investment generates $6 of pre-tax income, but the second dollar only generates an
additional $5.
166
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GM investment schedule
Investment

Cars manufactured

Income

$0
1
2
3
4
5

0
7
13
18
22
25

$0
7
13
18
22
25

The investor receives the entire income of the corporation and must decide
how to allocate investment between the two corporations.168 The investor
will set investment allocation to maximize the combined income of Ford and
GM.169 If the investor had $5 to invest, the investor could allocate $5 to Ford
and $0 to GM, $4 to Ford and $1 to GM, so on and so forth. Each investment
allocation would produce cars and generate income from Ford and GM, as
per their investment schedules above.
The table below shows the six whole dollar possible investment
allocations and the resulting total car production and income generated.

168

Eventually, the investor will receive the income of the corporation either from
dividends or share repurchases. Abstracting away the tax consequences of transferring
income from the firm to the investor greatly simplifies the model and only causes analytical
wrinkles if the taxes paid on these transfers are correlated with the income function or
effective tax rates of the firms. If either of these correlations exists, the model could be
modified to account for them. In any case, the basic point the model illustrates holds true.
169
If the investor has optimized, an additional dollar of investment in either firm yields
the same increase in income. This allocation is optimal because at any other allocation the
investor could shift $1 from the firm with lower marginal return to the firm with higher
marginal return and increase her income. In this example the marginal pre-tax incomes are
close but not be equal because the investor is investing in whole dollars, not in fractions of
dollars.
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Investment options
Investment
in Ford

Investment
in GM

Total
Cars

Total
Income

$5
4
3
2
1
0

$0
1
2
3
4
5

20
25
28
29
28
25

$20
25
28
29
28
25

The investor’s most profitable investment allocation is $2 in Ford and $3 in
GM. Every other investment allocation generates less income. Note that
this is also the allocation that leads to the most cars produced. Because it
maximizes the number of cars produced given the fixed investment of $5,
this is the best investment allocation in terms of economic efficiency.
In this example, everything works out for the best. The investor
maximizes profit and society maximizes cars produced. But the outcome in
this example rests on the assumptions that the investor had perfect
knowledge about the profitability of Ford and GM, that neither Ford nor GM
received additional investment for its tax-savviness, and that neither Ford
nor GM expended resources developing tax compliance and planning
strategies. The next Subpart relaxes these assumptions to demonstrate how
business tax privacy changes the picture.
B. The Benefits of Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
The previous Section offered an illustration of economic efficiency.
This Subpart explores the benefits of eliminating business tax privacy using
that same GM and Ford example but restricting information flows. First, it
asks what would happen if investors had less information and thus made
worse investing decisions. Second, it asks what would happen if businesses
could not learn from each other and thus some businesses gained a taxsavviness advantage over others. And third, it asks what would happen if,
again, businesses could not learn from each other and thus had to redundantly
develop the same tax strategies.
1. Improving Investor Forecasts
Part IIA demonstrated that investors could use business tax return
information to better estimate the risks and returns of the businesses they are
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considering investing in. Among other things, additional information helped
investors distinguish between fixed and variable costs and one-time and
recurring costs.
In general, the more information investors have, the better their
forecasts are. Better forecasts positively affect not only investor profits but
also the economy more generally by shifting investment to more productive
companies. Letting investors see tax return information improves forecasts
and thus directs resources to the most profitable and therefore most
productive activities.
In the previous Section, an investor allocated investment between Ford
and GM. Now we add nuance to this example by considering two alternative
scenarios—one in which the investor has access to business tax returns and
a second in which the investor does not. In each scenario, the investor
forecasts car production. The forecast with business tax return data is
correct, and the forecast without tax return data is simply the best the investor
can do with the information available.170 As the table below shows, the two
forecasts do not agree about which investment allocation is best. There are
many reasons why a forecast may be incorrect, including those discussed in
Part IIA.171 If the investor cannot observe business tax return information,
the investor will choose the allocation based on the incorrect forecast.
Investment options
Investment
in Ford

Investment
in GM

Total Car
Forecast with
Tax Return Data

Total Car
Forecast without
Tax Return Data

$5
4
3
2
1
0

$0
1
2
3
4
5

20
25
28
29
28
25

25
28
29
28
25
20

Without tax return data, the investor forecasts profit incorrectly and
allocates $3 to Ford and $2 to GM, instead of $2 to Ford and $3 to GM, the

170

For simplicity, the incorrect forecast simply switches Ford and GM’s production
schedules. Any forecasting error, however, that changes the investor’s desired investment
allocation will result in a similar decrease in production.
171
The examples in Part IIA included being unable to distinguish between one-time and
recurring items, being unable to distinguish between fixed and variable costs, and forecasting
less accurate aggregate growth rates as opposed to division or product specific growth rates.
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correct allocation. This misallocation decreases car production by 3.4%.172
Letting investors see tax return information improves these forecasts and
thus directs resources to the most profitable and therefore most productive
activities.
In this example, the investor either made the correct or the incorrect
forecast, depending on what information was available. In practice, the same
basic concepts apply, but instead of correct and incorrect forecasts the
investor ends up with a more accurate or less accurate forecast. Across many
investments and over many years, more accurate forecasts divert investment
to more productive businesses.
An additional benefit to eliminating business tax privacy comes from
making tax policy more transparent to investors. Benevolent tax policy
should be designed to induce a behavioral response from investors. Ideally,
tax policy should place higher tax burdens on firms that generate negative
externalities to discourage investment in those firms and lower tax burdens
on firms that generate positive externalities to encourage investment in those
firms. The more difficult it is for investors to know what current tax liability
is and what future tax liability will be, the more muffled the intended
behavioral response will be.
Consider, for example, a tax policy that encourages R&D and thus
benefits parties unrelated to the business undertaking the R&D. This is an
economically efficient policy, but if investors cannot observe the tax benefits
of R&D, they may not reward a firm for its R&D activity. As demonstrated
in Part IIA, investors might assume the R&D tax incentive is nonrecurring
or they might assume it is a risky tax shelter. In either case, investors would
underinvest in a firm providing positive externalities.
2. Homogenizing Business Tax Outcomes
Even if investors have all the information they need, they would still
invest in less productive businesses if those businesses were tax-savvy.
Investors make their investing decisions based on forecasts of after-tax
income. If two firms are equally productive but one has a lower tax rate, the
one with the lower tax rate will be a more attractive investment. The same
principle applies more generally: firms with lower tax rates will receive more
investment relative to firms with higher tax rates. If the differences in
effective tax rates are large enough, then a less productive, low-tax firm
would look more attractive to investors than a more productive, high-tax
firm.173
172

A 3.4% difference in production matters: 3.4% of US GDP is hundreds of billions of
dollars. That is, however, not to say that this Article makes any estimate about how large the
productivity gains from eliminating business tax privacy would be.
173
Uniform taxes may distort decision making too if a uniform tax causes investors to
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Rewarding a tax-savvy business with additional investment may make
sense from an investor’s perspective but is not good for productivity. 174
Maximizing productivity requires that investment be allocated based solely
on how productive businesses are. Rewarding businesses that are tax-savvy
at the expense of businesses that are less tax-savvy but more productive
results in less economic output.
In our example, if both Ford and GM faced the same effective tax rate,
then taxes would not change investment allocation. The tax would reduce
the income derived from both firms by the same proportion. Assuming
overall investment did not decrease, the investor’s rate of return would fall,
but the number of cars produced would remain the same.
If, however, Ford and GM had different effective tax rates because one
was more tax-savvy, the investor would shift her investment around to
reduce total tax liability.175 Doing so would lower the pre-tax income of the
investor, but the decreased tax burden would more than make up for the lost
pre-tax income. The larger the variance in tax outcomes across firms, the
more investment would shift to tax-savvy firms, regardless of the
productivity consequences.
More concretely, assume that Ford has an effective tax rate of 10% and
GM has an effective tax rate of 30%. The following table computes aftertax income for Ford and GM.

reallocate their resources. In the absence of an optimal tax purpose, however, non-uniform
taxes have a much larger distortionary effect because they change the relative attractiveness
of different firms, irrespective of their productivity.
174
That is not to say that all tax variation is bad. Returning to our example, if GM uses a
more toxic production process (which might explain why GM can produce cars at a lower
cost) and the government determines that the optimal policy is to discourage investment in
toxic production processes through the tax system, then GM should have a higher tax rate.
While this results in fewer cars, it also results in greener production, which may be a beneficial
tradeoff. In general, tax rate variation may be beneficial if it corrects externalities, generates
revenue with the smallest possible deadweight loss, or stimulates the economy in a recession.
In each of those cases, the optimal tax policy might place a differentiated burden on different
corporations. But there is no economic efficiency rationale to divert scarce resources to a
corporation because it has a lower effective tax rate stemming from its tax strategy. In theory,
it is possible that firms with better tax planning have more elastic responses to taxes, in which
case it would decrease productivity to eliminate differentiated tax burdens.
175
The investor would maximize return by allocating investment such that both
investments had equal after-tax marginal returns. If at a certain allocation both firms had the
same pre-tax marginal return, the investor could shift investment from the high tax firm to the
low tax firm and increase income.
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Investment options
Investment
in Ford

Investment
in GM

Pre-tax
Income

Tax
Liability

After-tax
Income

$5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

$0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00

$20.00
25.00
28.00
29.00
28.00
25.00

$2.00
3.90
5.40
6.50
7.20
7.50

$18.00
21.10
22.60
22.50
20.80
17.50

The more investment GM receives, the higher the combined effective tax
rate of GM and Ford because GM has a higher effective tax rate. Just as
before, the highest pre-tax income is generated if the investor allocates $2 to
Ford and $3 to GM. If, however, the investor moves $1 from GM to Ford,
then pre-tax income will fall by $1 to $28, but tax liability will fall by even
more, by $1.10, from $6.50 to $5.40. The investor loses $1 of after-tax
income but gains $1.10 of after-tax income. Thus, from the investor’s
perspective, the optimal investment allocation is $3 in Ford and $2 in GM.
But this is not optimal from an economic efficiency perspective. This
investment allocation reduces the number of cars manufactured from 29 to
28, as compared to the pre-tax or no-tax case. The tax variation led to a
worse investment allocation. The total number of cars produced decreased
by 3.4%, even though the total investment, $5, did not change.
It does not matter which firm has the lower effective tax rate. Even
though in this example GM produces more cars at each level of investment,
the total number of cars produced declines when GM has the lower effective
tax rate. To illustrate this point, the following table shows investment
allocation when Ford is taxed at a rate of 30% and GM is taxed at a rate of
10%.
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Investment options
Investment
in Ford

Investment
in GM

Pre-tax
Income

Tax
Liability

After-tax
Income

$5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

$0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00

$20.00
25.00
28.00
29.00
28.00
25.00

$6.00
6.10
5.80
5.10
4.00
2.50

$14.00
18.90
22.20
23.90
24.00
22.50

From the investor’s perspective, the optimal investment allocation is $1 in
Ford and $4 in GM. But this is not optimal from an economic efficiency
perspective. This investment allocation reduces the number of cars
manufactured from 29 to 28, compared to the pre-tax or no-tax case. Once
more, tax variation led to a worse investment allocation. The total number
of cars produced decreased by 3.4%, even though the total investment, $5,
did not change. In the global economy, a decrease in the production of goods
and services by even a fraction of a percent would result in hundreds of
billions of dollars of lost production.
There are many ways to add nuance to this model, but the fundamental
point remains: tax variation changes investment allocation.176 Firms with
lower effective tax rates will receive more investment than they would have
if all firms faced the same effective tax rate.
How does all this relate to business tax privacy? Recall from Part IIB
that corporations are very unlikely to have identical effective tax rates
because of differences in strategy, discretion, and error—among other
things. But eliminating business tax privacy would allow every firm to learn
from the returns of other businesses. With public access to business tax
returns, businesses would adopt each other’s tax strategies, make the same
judgment calls, and find errors in their own tax accounting. Tax preparers
(who would be partially freed from confidentiality agreements), activist
investors, and consulting firms could catalyze tax outcome
homogenization.177 This would lead to business tax standards for successful
tax avoidance (i.e. benchmarking), and firms could be evaluated along
176
The above logic applies equally well when there is an arbitrary number of firms, when
there is a secondary market for investment securities, when the model is dynamic, and when
investment supply is responsive to return. These modifications would not alter the
fundamental result of the model.
177
Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 821.
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avoidance metrics just as they could for customer satisfaction and workplace
safety.178
Eliminating business tax privacy would make tax planning and
compliance strategies more homogenous across firms, making the relative
marginal profits of firms depend less on their tax strategies. In essence, tax
privacy is a barrier preventing firms from having the same tax compliance
and planning, which allows different firms to play by different tax rules.
Firms should receive more investment if they are more productive, but there
is no social benefit to rewarding firms that have lower tax rates because of
their tax compliance and planning strategies. Making business tax
compliance and planning strategies more homogenous across businesses
reduces the variation in effective business tax burdens and ultimately leads
to businesses receiving investment commensurate to their productivity and
not how tax savvy they are.179
3. Reducing Tax Compliance Costs
Beyond generating undesirable tax variation that distorts investment,
business tax privacy inflates already substantial business tax planning and
compliance costs. To comply with tax law, businesses must record their
transactions, submit documents to the IRS, and remit payment. This is not a
simple exercise: GE’s annual corporate tax returns fill approximately 57,000
pages.180 Businesses also exert considerable effort structuring transactions
to minimize tax liability.181 Recall that GE’s tax department, at one time the
best tax law firm in the world, employed nearly 1,000 people.182 More
generally, the IRS estimates that taxpayers spend nearly six billion hours per
year complying with tax law, 359 million hours of which are spent by
178

Id.; Blank, supra note 6, at 62–8.
Another benefit of uniform tax compliance and planning is that it would make the cost
of valuing firms lower because investors could correctly assume a smaller range of possible
business tax strategies.
180
John McCormack, GE Filed 57,000-Page Tax Return, Paid No Taxes on $14 Billion
in Profits, WKLY STANDARD (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:11 PM), http:// www.weeklystandard.com/blo
gs/ge-filed-57000-page-tax-return-paid-no-taxes-14-billion-profits_609137.html. Although
a considerable portion of GE’s tax efforts are directed at compliance, GE also directs
substantial resources towards sheltering its income.
181
Lillian Mills, Merle M. Erickson & Edward L. Maydew, Investments in Tax Planning,
20 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 1 (1998). Accounting firms provide tax services for businesses
looking to minimize tax liability. See generally Tim Anson et al., Integrated Global
Structuring: Aligning Global Business Models and Tax Planning, INT’L TAX SERVS.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2008).
182
David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html.
Businesses more generally also spend substantial amounts on tax compliance and planning.
Lillian Mills, Merle M. Erickson & Edward L. Maydew, Investments in Tax Planning, 10 J.
AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1 (1998).
179
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corporations on their returns.183
Businesses and practitioners cannot learn from each other’s work
because business tax returns are private.184 This means that (1) each firm
must pay its own in-house or external tax practitioners and (2) no single tax
practitioner can look at all the business tax returns together and derive the
most efficient tax strategies. As a result, several tax consultants redundantly
develop the same tax strategies and write similar tax opinions.185
Consequently, business tax privacy generates substantial economic waste.186
Making returns public would disseminate tax-sheltering knowledge.
With access to the universe of returns, consultancies would be able to use
machine learning and sophisticated statistical techniques that would find the
best tax strategies.187 Whatever one thinks of tax-efficient strategizing, this
approach would eliminate the economic waste inherent in redundant tax
planning.188 The tax reform passed in late 2017, for example, has already
183

TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 1 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2008), https://www
.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf.
184
There is substantial variation to the extent that businesses outsource tax compliance
and planning. Some businesses perform tax compliance functions internally, some outsource
them, but most fall between these extremes. GE, for example, once had a tax department that
employed 1,000 people, but many of those employees now work for PWC. Amato, supra
note 135. For businesses that perform tax compliance internally, business tax privacy clearly
increases compliance costs because businesses cannot see how other corporations handle
similar tax issues. Instead each business must independently and redundantly research myriad
tax issues. For businesses that outsource tax compliance, business tax privacy increases
compliance costs but these costs are mitigated, albeit only slightly, by the fact that the law
and accounting firms that provide tax compliance services can develop in-house knowledge
that multiple clients will receive. Nevertheless, two factors limit the extent to which
compliance costs are held down by large accounting and law firms. First, business tax privacy
may still limit the extent to which accountants and lawyers can use tax knowledge developed
for one client to service another. Second, the markets that accounting and law firms operate
in are not competitive, increasing the ability of these large firms to profitably engage in
redundant work.
185
See James R. Hines Jr., On the Timeliness of Tax Reform, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1043 (2004)
(showcasing a model in which eliminating tax shelters quickly increases the total expenditure
on socially wasteful activities as firms seek to develop new tax shelters).
186
Society is devoting scare resources to redundantly researching tax shelters when those
resources could instead be used to produce goods and services, advance science, teach the
young, or perform any number of other valuable functions. Of course, there is another
possibility: ending corporate privacy could demonstrate the efficacy of tax consultants and
increase their use. Given the prevalence of aggressive tax planning and sheltering, this is
unlikely.
187
Some software already exists—for example, GoSystem and Fast Tax. These programs
are designed to reduce compliance costs (much like TurboTax for individual taxpayers),
which will lower tax variation. A sophisticated program using big data and machine learning,
however, would be able to do much more.
188
Some scholars believe that corporations are near the maximum possible sheltering.
Lee Sheppard, Should Corporate Tax Returns Be Disclosed?, 142 TAX NOTES 1381, 1382
(2014) (quoting Reuven Avi-Yonah, who suggests that we are near the maximum possible
corporate aggressiveness). If that is the case, it would be better for society to let corporations
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increased the revenues of the largest accounting firms by billions of
dollars.189 Each of these firms is researching the same topics, and some of
these topics may be researched independently for many different clients
because business tax privacy prevents businesses from learning from one
another.
Society can realize substantial benefits from innovation. There are
numerous examples of recent technologies that have improved and saved
lives, including safer automobiles, new medicines, and advances in
communications technology. But the reasoning that suggests we should
encourage or protect these innovations does not apply to tax shelters. Most
tax shelters do not make the world better off because they do not create
anything of value. They simply change the distribution of tax burdens and
drain resources that could have been used more beneficially. Moreover, tax
shelters encourage a race to the bottom because no business wants to be at a
disadvantage.190 Businesses devote resources to developing tax shelters
because if they do not, another business will, and that business will become
more attractive to investors.
C. The Potential Costs of Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
Eliminating business tax privacy will improve investor decisionmaking, reduce capital misallocation, and decrease waste from redundant
business tax compliance and planning costs. But the same spreading of
information that has these benefits may also have some downsides. This
Subpart considers the most costly of these downsides and suggests reasons
why eliminating business tax privacy may nonetheless be the better policy.
1. Lower Business Tax Revenue
Some scholars have suggested that eliminating business tax privacy
would lower government revenue.191 With access to the universe of business
maintain those shelters without redundant shelter-development expenditures.
189
Michael Cohn, Tax Reform Boosts Consulting Revenue for Accounting Firms, ACCT.
TODAY (June 6, 2018), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-reform-law-boosts-cons
ulting-revenue-for-big-four-accounting-firms.
190
Firms expending resources to lower their tax liability is rent-seeking. Rent-seeking
entails using scarce resources in a manner that produces no social value to secure some private
benefit. See generally Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,
63 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). It’s possible that all businesses would agree to substantially
limit tax sheltering if they could be sure that all other businesses would do the same. This
would allow them to direct resources to other more productive endeavors.
191
There are unlikely scenarios in which a better understanding of IRS enforcement
would lead firms to adopt less aggressive tax strategies. In that case (examining this argument
alone), government revenue would increase if business tax privacy were eliminated.
Businesses learning from one another would lead to additional government revenue if, for
example, firms learned to keep away from aggressive strategies that the IRS might combat.
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tax returns, businesses would learn more about different tax sheltering
strategies.192 Moreover, firms could estimate a tax aggressiveness frontier,
essentially determining which combinations of tax strategies are safe from
IRS action and which are not.193 Firms would have an incentive to opt for
the maximum tax aggressiveness that would not invite additional IRS
scrutiny. Combined, this tax shelter proliferation and lost IRS strategic
advantage would allow firms to have a lower effective tax rate.
There are, however, two reasons to doubt that this revenue reduction
will be substantial. First, eliminating business tax privacy increases the tax
base by increasing productivity. Thus, while effective tax rates may fall,
those rates will be applied to more business income, and a smaller rate times
a larger base has an ambiguous effect on revenue. Second, more eyes on
business tax returns are likely to increase compliance by reducing tax
evasion and extremely aggressive tax avoidance.194 Thus, while some tax
sheltering strategies are likely to become commonplace, others are likely to
become less used.
Even if there were a substantial reduction in revenue, Congress could
easily change fiscal policy along another dimension to recuperate that
revenue.195 Optimal tax policy requires collecting tax revenues sufficient to
fund the government, taking equity, efficiency, and administration
considerations into account.196 And if, as this Article argues, business tax
privacy is a very economically inefficient means by which to maintain
government revenue, then we are better off eliminating business tax privacy
and recuperating the lost revenue with another policy.197
2. Proprietary Business Information Made Public
Some have asserted that business tax returns contain information that,
Investors learning from business tax returns would also lead to additional government revenue
if, for example, investors flocked to firms with conservative tax approaches.
192
Blank, supra note 6, at 62–69.
193
Assuming the IRS did not change its enforcement strategy.
194
Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62.
195
Since 1985, Congress has made several changes to the income tax, including changing
corporate statutory rates. See, e.g, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2249; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 2264 Stat. 166.
196
Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 128, at 14. Indeed, because government revenue is not
an end in itself, it is possible but highly unlikely given the federal government current budget,
that the revenue need not be recuperated.
197
I take no position here on what the better alternatives are but will note two possibilities.
One, Congress could simply increase corporate tax rates—this could generate revenues
equivalent to the status quo much more efficiently. Two, the US could adopt a value-added
tax as suggested by many in tax policy circles. In the unlikely case that the costs of raising
revenue using other policy dimensions are exceedingly high, a welfare maximization and a
government revenue maximization paradigm would yield the same result: business tax
privacy is the better policy.
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if released, could harm businesses.198 Although there are many pieces of
information that a business might not want public, this argument seems
specifically to refer to information that competitors could use to that
business’s disadvantage.199
While this raises a plausible issue, there are two reasons why it is
unlikely that publicizing proprietary information on tax returns will cause
severe economic disruptions—it may even have economic benefits. First,
access to proprietary information is a two-way street. Firm A certainly does
not want Firm B to see its information. But Firm A does want to see Firm
B’s information. If business tax privacy is eliminated, Firm A will benefit
at Firm B’s expense because A can see B’s tax return, but B will also benefit
at A’s expense because B can see A’s return. The proprietary information
argument ignores this symmetry: competitors should both benefit from and
be hurt by additional access to information. Of course, this is not to say that
all firms would be equally benefited or hurt by the policy, but in aggregate
this is not so dire a concern as some have claimed. Ultimately, the efficiency
gains described above make eliminating business tax privacy a net positive
for businesses.
Second, and more importantly, access to proprietary information would
increase competitiveness, which would have widespread economic
benefits.200 Business tax privacy makes it easier for businesses to hide what
their best products and best markets are, which increases their market
power—their ability to sell at higher prices with less innovation. If
competitors could access proprietary information, businesses would become
more competitive, which would drive down prices and increase
innovation.201
The proprietary information argument becomes somewhat more
compelling when considered from a global perspective. Eliminating
business tax privacy might disadvantage US businesses because they would
have to disclose information that their foreign competitors would not—
198
This information includes “revenue and expense information by legal entity,
jurisdiction, and functional category.” Tax Executives Institute, supra note 7, at 242.
199
Id.
200
A student at the University of Richmond School of Law raised the possibility that
business tax information could be used to conduct espionage on firms that provide goods and
services to the US military. If this is the case, then clearly those firms should be exempted
from public disclosure.
201
The benefits from increased competition would have to be weighed against any
chilling effect on investment. It is possible that a business might not choose to invest in a
new product line or market because it did not believe it could realize a sufficient return on the
initial investment if other competitors became aware of this business move. This is only
possible in the somewhat unusual circumstance where the first mover must pay substantial
investment costs that subsequent movers will not have to pay. Intellectual property law may
prevent this from being a substantial cost.
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although some countries do require some business tax disclosures.202 It is,
however, not clear to what extent business tax information would be a boon
to foreign competitors. The US subsidiaries of foreign businesses would still
have to disclose their US returns, so to the extent that a foreign advantage
would materialize, it would have to stem from non-US business operating
outside the US. Moreover, investor preferences for transparency may lead
to US firms becoming substantially more attractive for global investment.203
Finally, because the US has substantial clout, other countries may follow suit
and also limit business tax privacy.
3. Elimination of Tax-related Jobs
The one group that benefits unequivocally from the current rules are
those that develop the tax shelters—mostly accountants and lawyers that
may work for a business or a consultancy that advises many businesses. If
business tax privacy were eliminated, the value of developing new tax
shelters would diminish and the demand for tax accountants and lawyers
might shrink.
There are two reasons, however, why this potential cost should not be
a major factor when evaluating business tax privacy. First, even with
business tax privacy eliminated, the tax code will still be very long and very
complex. Tax compliance and planning will still require many lawyers and
accountants. Second, in the long run, the world is better off with fewer
people developing tax shelters because they would instead be doing
something more valuable. In the United States, there are few remaining
telephone operators, typewriter repair-people, and stable attendants. Despite
the fact that these were commonplace jobs within the not so distant past,
current employment rates are unaffected by the disappearance of these jobs.
Policymakers should be cognizant of the hardships experienced when the
economic forces that feed an industry dry up, but the solution should be to
help with the transition, not prop up unproductive industries.
4. Reduced Tax Compliance
Businesses do not want to share their tax information. To that end, if
business tax privacy were eliminated, businesses might reduce their
compliance with tax law to keep some information private.204 This is
202

Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 811–12.
See generally Virgina Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for
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certainly a possibility, though it remains an open question how large this
effect would be. If returns were made public, investors might reward firms
for revealing more information, in which case the IRS might experience
increased compliance with tax law. Moreover, evidence suggests that
additional scrutiny tends to lead to increased compliance, and eliminating
business tax privacy would result in substantially more scrutiny.205 Variants
of the algorithms that would help businesses optimize their tax compliance
and planning could be used to detect non-compliance. And if Congress and
the IRS suspect reduced compliance, they could alter audit procedures and
non-compliance penalties to minimize the negative effects of reduced
compliance.
5. Antitrust Concerns
There are two antitrust concerns associated with eliminating business
tax privacy. First, businesses attempting to collude with one another could
use tax returns to help verify that their partners are not deviating from the
collusion agreement. Second, one business might be able to reverseengineer cost data for a competitor and undercut that competitor. Both of
these are legitimate concerns, but the obvious policy remedy for these
anticompetitive behaviors is antitrust law. Using tax privacy to achieve
better antitrust outcomes has all the undesirable economic efficiency
consequences discussed in this Article—consequences that would be
avoided if antitrust law were used to address these antitrust concerns.
D. Alternatives to Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
Several policy prescriptions might alleviate the economic distortions
caused by business tax privacy without eliminating business tax privacy. A
simpler tax code could limit the potential for tax sheltering, decrease
compliance costs, and make forecasting future tax liability easier.206 Lower

compliance”). See also Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826; Hoopes,
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See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation
in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, in PATH TO
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business tax rates would reduce the incentive to tax-shelter, which would
decrease tax variation and the extent to which tax decisions determine firm
value.207 Eliminating business taxes would render the entire debate moot.
Tweaking the Internal Revenue Code to make business tax returns
public has two advantages over these other policy prescriptions. First, it does
not require any major legislation—it only requires a few modifications to the
Internal Revenue Code’s section on tax privacy.208 To the extent that more
complicated legislation is less likely to be enacted or more likely to have
unintended consequences, eliminating business tax privacy will be
preferable. Second, businesses already file tax returns. Thus, businesses
will bear no additional compliance costs if business tax privacy is eliminated.
Solutions that involve other changes to the tax code would create additional
compliance burdens, as would any solution that required firms to prepare
additional documents.
Others have suggested that some businesses, particularly corporations,
should be compelled to publish very limited information from their tax
returns—for example, their tax liability or, for public companies, a
reconciliation between their financial statements and taxes paid.209 While
these additional disclosures may have some benefits, they will not
substantially mitigate the economic distortions addressed here because the
real value of business tax returns comes from the detailed information, not
bottom line numbers. From the perspective of investors, the more
information they have, the better. Knowing the exact business tax liability
for one year will not be particularly useful for investors because, without
understanding the components of tax liability, investors will still be
handicapped when attempting to forecast future tax liability. Similarly, if
businesses are unable to learn exactly what other businesses are up to, then
the extent to which tax compliance and planning strategies will flow between
businesses will be limited. Without this exchange of information,
investment will not be redirected to more productive firms and redundant,
socially wasteful expenditures on tax compliance and planning will not
decrease.
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CONCLUSION
Economic efficiency is paramount to tax policy, but on one important
issue—whether businesses should be entitled to tax privacy—the efficiency
criterion has received short shrift. This Article evaluates business tax
privacy using the same efficiency criteria applied to other tax issues and
argues that eliminating business tax privacy would be beneficial. Public
access to business tax returns was a feature of the country’s first corporate
tax legislation. Economic efficiency considerations commend a return to our
original approach.

